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Abstract 
Previous research on migration has focused more on the effect of wage differences between the 
destination and the origin on migration and less on how non-pecuniary attachments workers have 
to their current location may affect their migration decisions. In this paper, we examine how the 
presence of a strong social network and desirable location amenities in the current location may 
deter individual migration across U.S. metropolitan areas. Our empirical results show that, 
controlling for wage and housing cost differences between metropolitan areas, workers with 
strong attachments to their current location are significantly less likely to move. Interestingly, the 
effects of a strong social network and desirable location amenities on individual migration 
decisions are more important than the effect of wage or housing cost differentials between the 
destination and the origin. 
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The Effect of Local Ties, Wages, and Housing Costs on Migration Decisions 
1. Introduction 
The human capital theory of migration suggests that a worker chooses to move to another 
location only if the additional lifetime benefits from moving exceed individual mobility costs. 
According to this general framework, holding individual mobility costs constant, workers with 
higher returns from migration (i.e. higher wages in the destination) are more likely to move than 
their peers. This idea has found substantial support by numerous research papers (Mincer, 1978; 
Robinson and Tomes, 1982; Keith and McWilliams, 1999; Yankow, 1999; Dahl, 2002). 
Previous research on migration has focused more on the effect of wage differentials between 
the destination and the origin on migration and less on how non-pecuniary attachments workers 
have to their current location may affect their migration decisions. For example, workers who 
enjoy an expanded social network in their current location may be less likely to migrate than 
others. It may also be true that, ceteris paribus, individuals in locations with desirable amenities 
are less willing to migrate than those in undesirable locations. 
The negative effect of strong local ties on individual migration is hardly a new concept. 
Sjaastad (1962) argues that individual migration decisions are greatly affected by the strength of 
the social network individuals enjoy in their current location and by other location 
characteristics. Speare et al (1989) present evidence that individuals with friends and relatives in 
their current location, are less likely to move than their counterparts, while Michaelides (2009) 
shows that locally born workers or married workers with locally born spouses are less mobile 
than their peers. There is also strong evidence that workers in desirable locations are 
significantly less likely to migrate than their peers (Fields, 1979, Cushing, 1987, Clark and 
Hunter, 1996; Rupasingha and Goetz, 2004; Huffman and Feridhanusetyawan, 2007; Chen and 
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Rosenthal, 2008). Although previous research recognizes that a strong social network and 
desirable location amenities in the origin may be significant migration deterrents, there is limited 
empirical work that examines their effect on migration, controlling for wage and housing cost 
differences between the origin and the destination. 
In this paper, we examine the degree to which a strong social network and desirable location 
amenities may influence individual migration between metropolitan areas. To do so, we use the 
2000 U.S. Decennial Census, a dataset that has been widely used by previous research to 
examine the determinants of migration. This data enables us to identify which workers have an 
expanded social network in their current location, namely locally born workers and married 
workers whose spouse is locally born. In addition, this data identifies the metropolitan area of 
residence of respondents, enabling us to link it to other data sources that contain measures of 
location amenities. Using this information, we estimate a structural migration model which 
produces the effect of local ties on migration decisions, controlling for wage and housing cost 
differences between the destination and the origin. Our results show that workers with a strong 
social network (i.e. locally born workers and married workers whose spouse is locally born) and 
workers in metropolitan areas with desirable amenities are significantly less likely to move than 
their counterparts. In fact, our empirical results suggest that these non-pecuniary attachments 
have a much more significant effect on individual migration decisions than do wage and housing 
cost differences. 
 
2. Conceptual Framework 
Workers may face two types of mobility costs, pecuniary and non-pecuniary. Pecuniary costs 
are associated with the actual move and do not generally persist after the move to another 
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location is completed. Non-pecuniary (or psychic) costs, in contrast, may persist even after the 
move is completed, leading to lower utility levels over the lifetime of the worker. The best 
example, perhaps, of a persistent non-monetary mobility cost is the loss of the social network the 
worker enjoys in his current location. Workers with an expanded social network in their current 
location (e.g. locally born workers or married workers whose spouse was locally born) would be 
less willing than their counterparts to move to another location, controlling for the associate 
benefits of migration. Another example of non-pecuniary mobility costs is the loss of desirable 
amenities workers enjoy in their current location. 
To test if ties to the current location are important deterrents of migration, we employ the 
classic migration decision framework, in which individual migration decisions depend on wage 
and housing cost differences between the origin and the best alternative destination and on 
individual mobility costs.1 In this context, worker wages in the origin and in the destination 
indicate the wages the worker would receive over his lifetime in each location. Similarly, the 
average housing cost in the origin and the destination indicate the housing cost the worker would 
pay in each location over his lifetime. Mobility costs include the non-pecuniary costs a worker 
suffers over his lifetime if he decides to move; in this case, the loss of the social network and the 
amenities he enjoys in his current location. 
Let wages for worker i in location K be KiW and the wages of the same worker if he moved to 
the best alternative destination be KiW
~ . Similarly, let KH  and KH~ be the average housing cost in 
the current and in the alternative location, respectively. The individual mobility costs for worker 
i are denoted by iC , which includes the monetary value of the loss of the social network and of 
                                                 
1 See Borjas (1999) for a detailed discussion of the migration decision framework. 
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the amenities the worker enjoys in his current location. Under these assumptions, the migration 
probability for worker i is: 
)0~~Pr( >−−−−= iKKKiKiKi CHHWWM       (1) 
In words, the probability of moving from location K for worker i ( KiM ) increases in the 
wage differential between the destination and the origin ( Ki
K
i WW −~ ) while it declines in the 
housing cost differential between the destination and the origin ( KK HH −~ ) and in the worker’s 
individual mobility costs ( iC ). Worker i will choose to move only if the benefits of moving (i.e. 
wage differential minus housing cost differential) exceed his mobility costs. To estimate the 
effect of wages, housing costs, and mobility costs on the probability of moving, we need to 
construct appropriate measures of each and estimate the structural model implied by Equation 1. 
A standard issue when estimating migration decision models is that origin wages ( KiW ) are 
observed for workers who stay in their current location (non-movers), but are unavailable for 
workers who moved out of the location (movers). By the same token, there is no direct measure 
of best alternative destination wages ( KiW
~ ) for non-movers. A straightforward way to construct 
origin and destination wages for non-movers and movers is to estimate two separate wage 
equations, one for each group. Using the predictions from the two wage equations, we can 
construct the predicted origin and destination wages for all workers in the sample. The problem 
with this approach, however, is that it ignores the migration selection bias: if movers earn higher 
wages than non-movers in both the origin and the destination, the predicted origin wages would 
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underestimate the origin wages for movers.2 Similarly, the predicted destination wages would 
overestimate the destination wages for non-movers. 
To mitigate the potential selection bias, we employ the Heckman selection model. This model 
enables the construction of consistent estimates of worker wages in the origin and the 
destination, by controlling for the potential migration selection bias in each wage equation 
(Heckman, 1979).3 Using this model, we can construct a selection term, also known as Mills 
Inverse Ratio, one for non-movers and one for movers, which is included as a control in each 
wage equation. The inclusion of the selection term in the wage equation eliminates the effect of 
the migration selection bias, enabling the production of consistent estimates of predicted wages. 
There are three steps we need to follow to implement this model. The first step is to estimate 
the reduced form migration model using probit. Let the wage equation for non-movers be: 
)0|( <+= KiKiKiKi MuEXW β         (2) 
Equation 2 presents wages for non-movers as a function of observable characteristics ( iX ) 
and the returns on those characteristics in location K ( Kβ ); since origin wages are only available 
for non-movers, the error term is conditional on the decision not to migrate. Similarly, let the 
wage equation for movers be: 
)0|~(~~ ≥+= KiKiKiKi MuEXW β         (3) 
Equation 3 indicates that wages for movers are a function of observable characteristics ( iX ) 
and of their returns in the best alternative destination ( Kβ~ ). The error term is conditional on the 
decision to move. Substituting Equations 2 and 3 into Equation 1, we produce the reduced form 
                                                 
2 There is considerable evidence that mobile workers are generally more skilled than their peers, thus earn higher 
wages both in the origin and the destination; see for example, Keith and McWilliams (1999) and Dahl (2002). 
3 The Heckman model has been widely used by prior research to account for the selection bias in estimating wages 
caused by individual migration decisions (e.g. Robinson and Tomes, 1982; Borjas, 1987). 
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migration model, which is a function of individual characteristics, origin and destination housing 
costs, and mobility costs: 
)(),~,( ZFCHHXFM i
KK
i
K
i =−=        (4) 
Assuming that F(.) is the normal cumulative distribution function, we can estimate Equation 
4 using a probit model. The second step is to use the results of the probit model to obtain the 
predicted values of the normal density and the cumulative distribution functions, f(.) and F(.), 
respectively. Using these predictions, we can construct the migration selection terms as follows: 
Non-Movers: 0
)(1
)( >−= ZF
Zf
NMλ  , Movers: 0)(
)( <−=
ZF
Zf
Mλ     (5) 
The final step is to estimate wage equations 2 and 3 by including the respective selection 
term as a control variable. By doing so, we control for the selection bias caused by the migration 
decision, enabling us to produce reliable predicted origin and destination wages for both movers 
and non-movers. If there is a positive migration selection bias (that is, if movers earn more in the 
destination than what non-movers would earn had they moved), then the coefficient of Mλ  
(which is negative by construction) in the wage equation will be negative and significant. 
Using the predicted origin and destination wages, we can then construct the predicted wage 
differential between the destination and the origin for each worker in the data. To estimate the 
migration structural model presented in Equation 1, we also need an appropriate measure of 
housing costs differences between the destination and the origin, indicators of an expanded social 
network, and measures of local amenities. In the following section, we describe in detail how we 
construct these measures for our analysis. 
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3. Data Description 
We use the 5% Public Use Micro Sample of the 2000 Decennial Census (2000 PUMS), 
which contains rich information on respondents’ employment and demographic characteristics. 
In addition, the data reports the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) of residence of respondents 
in 2000 and 1995, enabling us to identify which respondents moved between MSAs in that 
period. The availability of the above information is the reason why the Decennial Censuses have 
been widely used by researchers to examine the determinants of migration (Rabianski, 1971; 
Navratil and James, 1982; Dahl, 1990; Longino, 1990; Chen and Rosenthal, 2008). 
We constrain the sample to full-time employed males, ages 35 to 65, who lived in an MSA in 
1995 – see Table 1 for a sample description.4 In all, workers in the sample were living in 127 
distinct MSAs in 1995. This data is well suited for the purpose of this paper since it enables us to 
construct individual indicators of a strong local social network, as well as measures of average 
housing costs, by MSA. Moreover, we can identify each of the MSAs in the data, so we can link 
this data to other data sources which describe location amenities. 
3.1. Social Network Indicators 
Using the PUMS 2000, we construct two indicators of a strong social network in the current 
location: (a) worker lives in his state of birth in 1995 (State of Birth) and (b) married worker 
lives in his spouse’s state of birth in 1995 (Spouse State of Birth). The idea is that individuals 
                                                 
4 The disadvantage of the data is that worker demographic and employment characteristics are only reported for 
2000 and not for the period between 1995 and 1999.  This issue is shared by previous research which used the U.S. 
Censuses as well as by research which used the Canadian Census (e.g. Robinson and Tomes, 1977) to estimate 
migration models. Although race, gender, ethnicity, and nationality do not change, other characteristics, like 
education and marital status may change over time. To increase the probability that these characteristics as of 2000 
did not change between 1995 and 1999, we constrain the sample to individuals that are 35-65 years old; older 
workers are more likely to have the same industry, occupation, education, and marital status as in prior years. 
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who live in their own or their spouse’s state of birth enjoy an expanded social network and are 
therefore less likely to move than others.5 
To further support this point, we compare the migration propensities between all workers in 
the sample and those who lived in their state of birth or their spouse’s state of birth. Table 2 
shows that, in 1995, almost 41% of workers in the sample were living in their state of birth and 
more than 25% were living in their spouse’s state of birth. The same table shows that almost 
23% of the 241,821 individuals in the sample moved between MSAs from 1995 to 2000.6 
Migration propensity was substantially lower for workers who lived in their state of birth 
(12.2%) or their spouse’s state of birth (13.6%), providing support to the idea that these workers 
may be less likely to migrate because of their attachment to their current location. So, State of 
Birth and Spouse State of Birth are reasonable indicators of attachment to the current location 
and will be used in our analysis to capture the effect of an expanded social network on migration. 
3.2. Measure of Housing Costs, by MSA 
The 2000 PUMS reports the value of the housing unit in which the respondent was living at 
the time of the survey. Using the housing values reported by all employed respondents who lived 
in an MSA in 2000, we calculate the average housing value for each MSA in the data. Table 3 
reports the average housing value, by MSA, for select MSAs. The average housing value in an 
                                                 
5 State of Birth and Spouse State of Birth must satisfy two conditions to be used as proxies for local ties.  First, they 
need to be highly correlated with the variable of interest (local ties). Second, their difference with the variable of 
interest must be uncorrelated with the error term in the regression. Although the first condition is met, there may be 
some concerns about the second condition.  In particular, State of Birth may be positively correlated with 
unobserved skills that limit mobility (e.g., lack of opportunity).  This argument was refuted by previous work, which 
showed that State of Birth is uncorrelated with worker skills, thus uncorrelated with the error term (Speare et al., 
1982; Michaelides, 2009).  In the empirical results, we note some sensitivity analysis that provides further evidence 
that State of Birth is uncorrelated with unobserved skills. 
6 An individual may also move from a MSA to a rural area that is not within the boundaries of a MSA. According to 
the US Census Bureau (“Migration and Geographic Mobility in Metropolitan and Non-Metropolitan America: 1995 
to 2000”, August 2003), only about 2% of 1995 MSA residents moved to a non-MSA area by 2000. This indicates 
that an even smaller proportion of MSA residents moved to a rural area that is not adjacent to their 1995 MSA of 
residence.   
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MSA is an indication of the housing costs an individual living in that MSA would pay over his 
lifetime. According to Table 3, for example, the average housing value in San Francisco 
($593,128) was higher than that of Kansas City, MO ($357,071), indicating that the lifetime 
housing costs in San Francisco would exceed those in Kansas City. 
Using the housing value information, we construct the housing cost differential between the 
origin and the destination, by following three steps. First, we estimate a housing value equation 
where the dependent variable is the logarithm of the house value and controls include: size of 
house and of the lot in which is built, house age, heating system, type of housing unit, ownership, 
and MSA fixed effects.7 Second, we use the results to construct the predicted housing value, by 
MSA, holding house characteristics at their sample means. Table 4 presents the distribution of 
the average predicted housing value across MSAs. Controlling for housing unit characteristics, 
the MSA with the lowest and highest predicted housing value are, respectively, Duluth-Superior, 
MN ($226,735) and Stamford, CT ($737,156). 
The housing cost differential for each individual living in an MSA in 1995 is simply the 
difference between the logarithm of the predicted housing value across all MSAs in 2000 minus 
and the logarithm of the predicted housing value in the individual’s 1995 MSA.8 This measure is 
an indication of the relative housing costs in the worker’s current location compared to the 
housing costs in the remaining MSAs, and will be used in our analysis to capture the effect of the 
housing cost differential on migration. 
 
                                                 
7 In this regression, we use all employed individuals in the 2000 PUMS, who were living in 271 MSAs in 2000 
(759,106 observations). Regression results for the housing value equation are reported in Table A in the Appendix. 
8 For example, Table 4 shows that the predicted housing value across all MSAs is $413,036 and the predicted 
housing value in Orlando, FL is $397,658. The housing cost differential for a worker living in Orlando, FL in 1995 
would be equal to log(413,036)-log(397,658). 
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3.3. Location Amenities, by MSA 
We construct ten measures for three types of location characteristics – weather, population, 
and public finance/local economy. These are the typical categories of location characteristics 
shown by recent research work to have an important role in migration decisions (Clark and 
Hunter, 1996; Rupasingha and Goetz, 2004; Huffman and Feridhanusetyawan, 2007; and Chen 
and Rosenthal, 2008). Table 5 describes the amenity measures and the data source from which 
they were extracted. Weather amenities include Temperature, Snowfall, Precipitation 
Probability, and Probability Air Unhealthy. Population amenities include Crime Rate, Log 
Population per Square Mile, and the Pupil/Teacher Ratio. Finally, public finance/local economy 
characteristics include Public Sector, Tax Free State, and Unemployment Rate. 
In our empirical analysis, we use these measures to capture location characteristics that may 
affect worker migration decisions. We expect that desirable amenities would have a negative 
effect on moving, while undesirable location characteristics would have a positive effect. Our 
expectation is that individuals value mild weather conditions, so migration probabilities would 
decrease in Temperature, but would increase in Snowfall, Precipitation Probability, and 
Probability Air Unhealthy. We also expect workers to value low crime, low population density, 
and higher school quality, so migration probabilities would be higher for workers in MSAs with 
high crime rate, high per square mile population, and high pupil/teacher ratio. Finally, we expect 
workers to value living in a labor market with low public sector presence, no state income tax, 
and low unemployment rate; migration would thus increase in Public Sector and Unemployment 
Rate, but decrease in Tax Free State. 
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4. Empirical Results 
Using the data described in the previous section, we estimate the effect of local ties (State of 
Birth, Spouse State of Birth) and amenities on the probability of moving, controlling for wage 
and housing cost differences across locations. First, we estimate the Heckman selection model in 
order to construct reliable measures of worker wages in the origin and the destination. This 
involves estimating the reduced form probit (Equation 4) and the wage equations for movers and 
non-movers (Equations 2 and 3, respectively). Second, we use the constructed wage differences 
together with the measures of local ties and housing cost differences to estimate the structural 
probit model (Equation 1). Finally, we use the structural probit results to delineate the effect of 
each key characteristic on the probability of moving. 
To test the sensitivity of the regression results, we conduct the analysis using three different 
specifications: (a) controls for wage differences but not for housing costs differences or for 
amenities; (b) controls for wage and housing cost differences, but not for amenities; and (c) 
controls for wage differences, housing cost differences, and amenities. All specifications include 
available demographic and employment characteristics such as age, education, gender, race, and 
industry and occupation affiliation. 
4.1. Selection Model Regression Results 
We first estimate the reduced form probit (Equation 4), where the dependent variable is the 
probability of moving between MSAs. Since the reduced form probit does not control for wages, 
the estimated effect of each characteristic includes its direct effect on the probability of moving 
and its indirect effect through wages. Table 6 reports the marginal probability effect of each 
characteristic on the probability of moving for the reduced form probit equation. 
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Specification 1 (no housing cost differences, no amenities) results indicate that workers 
living in their state of birth and married workers living in their spouse’s state of birth are 15.6 
and 9 percentage points less likely to move than their peers, respectively. In specification 2, 
which controls for housing cost differences but not for amenities, the marginal probability effects 
of State of Birth and Spouse State of Birth are relatively unchanged, -15.8 and -9.4 percentage 
points, respectively. As expected, the housing cost differential (LogH Difference) has a 
significantly negative effect on migration. In specification 3, which controls for housing cost 
differences and for local amenities, the State of Birth and Spouse State of Birth marginal effects 
are -15.4 and -9.4 percentage points, respectively.9 In addition, the effect of LogH Difference 
remains negative and statistically significant. Desirable location amenities in the origin (e.g. 
Temperature, Tax Free State) have a significant negative effect on moving, while undesirable 
amenities (e.g. Snowfall, Crime Rate, and Unemployment Rate) have the opposite effect. 
Using the reduced form probit results, we construct the selection term for non-movers and 
movers, as shown in Equation 5, which are included as controls in their respective wage 
equations. Table 7 summarizes the regression results of the wage equations for the two worker 
groups, which include as controls all available demographic and employment characteristics, as 
well as MSA fixed effects.10 In all three specifications, the selection term coefficient for movers 
is significantly negative. Since by construction, the selection term for movers is negative, these 
results indicate that there is a positive migration selection bias; movers earn higher wages than 
                                                 
9 As indicated, there is some concern that State of Birth may be negatively correlated with unobserved worker skills.  
If so, the negative coefficient of State of Birth captures lack of opportunity to migrate rather than local ties.  To 
refute this point, we estimated all specifications excluding education and marital variables.  If State of Birth is 
negatively correlated with worker skills, then the coefficient of State of Birth should be even lower when we omit 
education and marital variables.  Our results show that the State of Birth coefficient is not statistically different from 
those presented in Table 6 once we omit education and marital variables – these results are available upon request.  
In addition, omitting State of Birth from the specification does not statistically affect the coefficient of Spouse State 
of Birth. 
10 MSA fixed effects capture wage differentials across MSAs that relate to differences in the cost of living or to 
differences in baseline productivity. 
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non-movers in both the origin and the destination.11 The remaining variables have typical effects 
on wages in all specifications. 
As previously described, we use the estimated wage equations to construct the predicted 
origin and destination wages for each individual in the sample. This enables the construction of 
LogW Difference, which is the difference between the logarithm of destination wages and the 
logarithm of origin wages. We include this variable in the structural probit model to capture the 
effect of wage differences between the destination and the origin on the probability of moving. 
4.2. Structural Probit Regression Results 
Table 8 presents the regression results for the structural probit model, for each of the three 
specifications (no housing costs, no amenities; housing costs, no amenities; and housing costs, 
amenities). In specification 1, the marginal probability effect of State of Birth and Spouse State 
of Birth is 15.5 and 9.1 percentage points, respectively, and is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. The wage differential between the destination and the origin, as captured by LogW 
Difference, has a significant positive effect on the probability of moving. This indicates that 
workers who would gain a higher destination-origin wage difference are more likely to move 
relative to their counterparts. 
In specification 2, where we also control for housing cost differences (LogH Difference), the 
effect of State of Birth and Spouse State of Birth increase slightly to -15.7 and -9.4 percentage 
points, respectively. LogW Difference has a significant positive effect on moving, while LogH 
Difference negatively affects moving. The latter result verifies that housing cost differences 
between the destination and the origin is an important consideration in moving decisions; 
workers in MSAs with low housing costs are less likely to move compared with their peers. 
                                                 
11 This is also verified by the p-value of the Likelihood Ratio Test, reported in the bottom row of Table 7. The null 
hypothesis that there is no positive migration selection bias for movers is rejected in all three specifications. 
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Specification 3 results indicate that State of Birth and Spouse State of Birth are strong 
deterrents of migration even after controlling for wage and housing cost differences and for local 
amenities. Wage and housing cost differences also remain significant determinants of moving 
decisions. In addition, desirable local amenities (Temperature and Tax Free State) have a 
significant negative effect on moving, while undesirable location characteristics (e.g. 
Precipitation Probability, Crime Rate, and Unemployment Rate) positively affect migration. 
Overall, the results in Table 8 illustrate the connection of an expanded social network, wage 
and housing cost differences, and amenities with migration decisions. Workers with a strong 
social network in their current location are significantly less likely to move than others. Workers 
who would gain higher wages in the destination are more likely to move, while workers who 
would face higher housing costs in the destination are less likely to move than others. Location 
amenities also have an important role in migration decisions; workers in more desirable locations 
are significantly less likely to move, after controlling for local ties, wage differences, and 
housing cost differences. 
4.3. Interpretation of the Results 
Understanding the relative importance of local ties, wages, housing costs, and amenities on 
migration decisions based on the empirical results as presented in Table 8 is not straightforward. 
In this section, we delineate the importance of each on the probability of moving using the 
regression results from the three specifications in Table 8. In particular, we calculate the 
predicted effect on the probability of moving of each of the following: (a) worker living in his 
state of birth, (b) married worker living in his spouse’s state of birth, (c) an increase in local 
wages by 10%, and (d) a decrease in local housing costs by 10%. These effects are calculated 
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holding all other worker characteristics and location amenities at their sample means. Table 9 
presents the results of this exercise. 
Workers who live in their state of birth are around 15.5 percentage points less likely to move 
than their counterparts, holding wages, housing costs, and amenities equal. In other words, a 
local worker is around 15.5 percentage points less likely to move than a non-local worker who 
lives in the same MSA and who would gain the same wage differential and suffer the same 
housing cost differential if he moved to another location. By the same token, a married worker 
who lives in his spouse’s state of birth is around 9.3 percentage points less likely to move than 
single workers or married workers who live outside their spouse’s state of birth. 
Table 9 also shows that, holding all else equal, a 10% increase in local wages reduces the 
probability of moving by 2.4 percentage points (specification 3). Although this is a significant 
effect on the probability of moving, its size lacks considerably the size of the effect of State of 
Birth and Spouse State of Birth. To emphasize this point, let us note that the marginal negative 
effect of being local on the probability of moving is equivalent to the effect of an increase in 
local wages by more than 50%. Similarly, the negative effect of working in the spouse’s state of 
birth is equivalent to that of an increase in local wages by more than 35%. 
A similar result applies for housing cost differences. A 10% decrease in local housing costs 
reduces the migration probability by 1.7 percentage points (specification 3). This effect is 
important but not nearly as substantial as the effect of a strong social network in the current 
location, as captured by State of Birth and Spouse State of Birth. In particular, the negative effect 
of State of Birth and Spouse State of Birth is equivalent to a decrease in local housing costs by 
nearly 70% and by nearly 50%, respectively. 
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We also use the regression results from specification 3 of Table 8 to delineate the effect of 
local amenities on the probability of moving. In particular, we calculate the predicted migration 
probability for the average worker in each MSA, based on the MSA’s location amenities and 
holding all other characteristics at their sample means. The difference between an MSA’s 
predicted migration probability and the mean predicted migration probability for the whole 
sample is the effect of local amenities on the probability of moving from the MSA. That 
difference is then decomposed in three components, each representing the contribution of a 
group of amenities on the probability of moving. The three groups of amenities are: (a) weather 
amenities – includes Temperature, Snowfall, Precipitation Probability, and Probability of 
Unhealthy Air, (b) population characteristics – includes Crime Rate, Log Population per Square 
Mile, and Pupil/Teacher Ratio, and (c) public finance, economy – includes Public Sector, Tax 
Free State, and Unemployment Rate. 
Table 10 presents the results of this exercise for the MSA with the lowest predicted migration 
probability (Austin, TX), the 20 MSAs with the largest population in the U.S., and the MSA with 
the highest predicted migration probability (Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY). Austin, TX is the most 
amenable MSA in the sample since it has the lowest predicted migration probability (17.8%). 
The migration probability of the average worker is 5 percentage points lower in Austin, TX than 
what it would be in the remaining MSAs in the sample, holding social network indicators, wage 
differences, and housing cost differences constant. This difference is attributed mainly to 
desirable weather amenities (-2 percentage points) and to local economic conditions (-2.2 
percentage points); Austin, TX features mild weather with low precipitation probabilities while it 
is in a state with no local income tax and a limited public sector. In contrast, the migration 
probability for the average worker would be 27.4% in Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY, 4.6 percentage 
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points higher than the sample mean. This differential is mainly attributed to the undesirable 
weather conditions of this MSA (4.4 percentage points). 
The differences in the average predicted migration probability across the 20 largest MSAs 
show the importance of weather characteristics on migration decisions. For example, the average 
worker would be 3.4 and 2.5 percentage points less likely to move out of Phoenix, AZ and San 
Diego, CA, respectively, due to the desirable weather conditions in these two MSAs. In contrast, 
undesirable weather characteristics increase the migration probability by as many as 2.5 
percentage points in Pittsburgh, PA. Local economic conditions also have an important effect on 
migration propensities. Among the 20 largest MSAs, the effect of public finance/economy 
characteristics on the migration probability varies from -2.2 percentage points (Dallas-Fort 
Worth, TX) to 1.9 percentage points (Riverside-San Bernardino, CA). The effect of population 
characteristics on migration is smaller but significant nevertheless. Among the 20 largest MSAs, 
this effect varies from -1.8 percentage points (Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN) to 0.9 percentage 
points (Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA). 
Overall, our results suggest that location amenities are very significant considerations in 
individual migration decisions. The migration probability for the average worker is 17.8% in 
Austin, TX (the most amenable MSA in the sample), whereas it is 27.4% in Buffalo-Niagara 
Falls, NY (the least amenable MSA in the sample). Considering that the average migration 
probability in the sample is 22.8%, location amenities may reduce or increase individual 
migration by as many as 5 percentage points. This is equivalent to a change in local wages by 
almost 20% or to a change in local housing costs by almost 30%. 
 
5. Conclusion 
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It is well established that worker migration decisions are greatly affected by wage differences 
between the destination and the origin. In particular, the higher is the wage differential between 
the destination and the origin the more likely workers are to migrate controlling for individual 
mobility costs. Researchers have argued that non-pecuniary mobility costs, such as an expanded 
social network and desirable location amenities, may be important deterrents of migration, 
leading workers to stay in low-wage locations instead of moving to high-wage destinations. 
There is very limited research, however, on the extent to which local ties may deter migration, 
controlling for wage and housing cost differences between the destination and the origin. 
This paper fills some of this gap. We construct two indicators of an expanded local social 
network (worker lives in his state of birth, worker lives in his spouse’s state of birth) and ten 
measures of location amenities (weather, population, and local economy). In addition, we 
produce appropriate measures of destination-origin differences in worker wages and in housing 
costs. Using this information, we estimate a structural model of individual migration. Empirical 
results show that workers with strong attachments to their current location – those with an 
expanded social network or those living in amenable MSAs – are significantly less likely to 
move than their peers. Results also confirm previous research which showed that migration is 
more prevalent among workers who would achieve higher lifetime earnings from moving and is 
less prevalent for workers who would pay higher housing costs if they decided to move. 
Although low wages and high housing costs in the destination are important deterrents of 
individual migration, their effect is not nearly as substantial as the negative effect of local ties on 
migration decisions. Workers living in their state of birth are more than 15 percentage points less 
likely to move relative to their counterparts, whereas a 10% increase in local wages or a 10% 
decrease in local housing costs only reduces migration probabilities by 2.4 or 1.7 percentage 
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points, respectively. This implies that the negative effect of being local on migration is 
equivalent to the effect of earning almost 50% higher wages. Similarly, being local has the same 
negative effect on migration as a reduction in local housing costs by nearly 70%. We also find 
that married workers who live in their spouse’s state of birth are 9.4 percentage points less likely 
to migrate than their peers. The negative effect of moving from the worker’s spouse state of birth 
is equivalent to the effect of earning more than 35% higher wages or paying nearly 50% lower 
housing costs in the current location. Location amenities also play an important role in individual 
migration decisions. The presence of desirable/undesirable location amenities may, ceteris 
paribus, reduce/increase individual migration propensities by as many as 5 percentage points. 
This is equivalent to a change in origin wages by almost 20% or to a change in local housing 
costs by almost 30%. 
Our findings shed more light on the importance of local ties in migration decisions. Although 
wage and housing cost differences are significant determinants of individual migration, the level 
of attachment workers feel to their current location appears to be a more significant consideration 
in individual migration decisions. Based on these results, we conclude that the importance of 
local ties, on account of an expanded social network or desirable amenities, should not be 
understated in future work that examines the determinants of worker migration. 
 
 
The Effect of Local Ties, Wages, and Housing Costs on Migration Decisions  20 
TABLES 
 
Table 1: Sample Description 
 Sample Proportion / Mean (st.dev.) 
Education  
   Less High School 10.6%
   High School Diploma 43.3%
   Associate Degree / Some College 7.3%
   College Degree 23.0%
   Post-Graduate Degree 15.8%
Age 44.2 (7.2)
Married 72.2%
Never Married 16.8%
Number of Children 1.2 (1.3)
Family Size 3.0 (1.6)
Race  
   White 88.6%
   Black 8.7%
   Other Race 12.7%
Hispanic 10.3 %
Disability 10.3%
Veteran 24.0%
Foreigner 8.4%
Note: Sample includes full-time employed males, ages 35-65, living in a 
metropolitan area in 1995.  Observations: 241,821. 
 
Table 2: Migration Probabilities and Attachment to Current Location 
 Total Movers (%) 
All 241,821 (100%) 22.7% 
State of Birth 98,539 (40.7%) 12.2% 
Spouse State of Birth 61,696 (25.5%) 13.6% 
Note: State of Birth = individual living in his state of birth in 1995. Spouse State of Birth = 
married individual living in his spouse’s state of birth in 1995. Sample includes full-time 
employed males, ages 35-65, living in a metropolitan area in 1995.  Observations: 241,821. 
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Table 3: Average Housing Unit Value, by MSA, Select MSAs 
 Mean (St. Dev.) 
All MSAs $442,417 (376,611) 
San Francisco, CA $593,128 (343,197) 
Los Angeles, CA $582,806 (385,873) 
New York City, NY $528,059 (369,294) 
Boston, MA $473,955 (340,390) 
Houston, TX $416,243 (402,178) 
Miami, FL $411,146 (397,674) 
Chicago, IL $406,603 (342,653) 
Phoenix, AZ $397,788 (370,019) 
Cleveland, OH $386,950 (362,058) 
Nashville, TN $381,495 (361,471) 
Kansas City, MO $357,071 (359,899) 
Detroit, MI $348,398 (317,097) 
Youngstown, PA $331,768 (369,443) 
Tuscaloosa, AL $321,291 (368,273) 
Sumter, SC $316,418 (380,751) 
Grand Rapids, IA $311,579 (322,095) 
Note: Sample includes all workers living in an MSA in 2000. Observations = 759,106. 
 
Table 4: Distribution of Average Predicted Housing Value across MSAs 
 Across MSAs
Mean $413,036
Standard Deviation $90,639
Minimum (Duluth-Superior, MN) $226,735
10th Percentile (Sheboygan, WI) $313,163
25th Percentile  (Syracuse, NY) $350,188
50th Percentile (Orlando, FL) $397,658
75th Percentile (Las Vegas, NV) $469,166
90th Percentile (Bridgeport, CT) $530,039
Maximum (Stamford, CT) $737,156
Note: Reported are distribution values across the 271 MSAs in the 2000 PUMS. 
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Table 5: Description of Metropolitan Area Amenities 
 Description Source Mean (St. Dev.) 
Temperature Average daily temperature National Climatic Data Center 
58.7 
(7.9) 
Snowfall Annual inches of snowfall, average values, 1971-2000. 
National Climatic 
Data Center 
18.1 
(21.1) 
Precipitation Probability 
Proportion of days with more 
than 1 inch of precipitation, 
1971-2000. 
National Climatic 
Data Center 
.276 
(.103) 
Probability Air Unhealthy Proportion of days with unhealthy air quality, 1995. 
US Environmental 
Projection Agency,  
City Air Quality Data 
.015 
(.026) 
Crime Rate Violent crimes per 100,000 residents. 
State and Metropolitan Area 
Data Book, 1997-98: 
Table B-5 
.004 
(.006) 
Log Population per Square Mile Logarithm of the population per square mile. 
State and Metropolitan Area 
Data Book, 1997-98: 
Table B-2 
6.46 
(.89) 
Pupil/Teacher Ratio 
Pupil to teacher ratio: 
Average values of 
elementary/secondary school 
universe, 1995-2000. 
Common Core of Data, 
National Center for 
Education Statistics 
19.4 
(6.6) 
Public Sector Proportion of earnings by the public sector. 
State and Metropolitan Area 
Data Book, 1997-98: 
Table B-7 
15.1 
(5.7) 
Tax Free State =1 if no state income tax, 0 otherwise 
Federation of Tax 
Administrators 
.176 
(381) 
Unemployment Rate Unemployment rate in 1996 
State and Metropolitan Area 
Data Book, 1997-98: 
Table B-8 
5.2 
(1.8) 
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Table 6: Reduced Form Probit Regression Results, Marginal Probability Effects 
 (1)
No Housing Costs, 
No Amenities
(2)
Housing Costs, 
No Amenities
(3)
Housing Costs, 
Amenities
State of Birth -.1556 (.0020)** -.1578 (.0018)** -.1539 (.0018)**
Spouse State of Birth -.0900 (.0020)** -.0940 (.0020)** -.0941 (.0020)**
LogH Difference -- -.1048 (.0028)** -.1290 (.0029)**
Temperature -- -- -.0004 (.0002)*
Snowfall -- -- .0006 (.0001)**
Precipitation Probability  -- -- .0726 (.0136)**
Probability Air Unhealthy -- -- .3575 (.0453)**
Crime Rate -- -- .2241 (.0594)**
Log Population per Square Mile -- -- .0025 (.0010)**
Pupil/Teacher Ratio -- -- .0007 (.0001)**
Public Sector -- -- .0005 (.0001)**
Tax Free State -- -- -.0098 (.0029)**
Unemployment Rate -- -- .3903 (.0543)**
Age -.0043 (.0015)** -.0043 (.0015)** -.0042 (.0015)**
Age Squared .0000 (.0000) .0000 (.0000) .0000 (.0000)
Less High School -.0371 (.0032)** -.0392 (.0031)** -.0405 (.0032)**
Associate Degree/Some College .0332 (.0036)** .0342 (.0036)** .0351 (.0037)**
College Degree .0729 (.0024)** .0785 (.0024)** .0797 (.0024)**
Post-Graduate Degree .1063 (.0028)** .1145 (.0029)** .1145 (.0029)**
Black -.0477 (.0028)** -.0475 (.0028)** -.0519 (.0028)**
Other Race -.0217 (.0027)** -.0119 (.0028)** -.0169 (.0028)**
Hispanic -.0182 (.0032)** -.0169 (.0033)** -.0291 (.0032)**
Married .0655 (.0032)** .0625 (.0033)** .0627 (.0033)**
Never Married -.0199 (.0032)** -.0233 (.0032)** -.0240 (.0032)**
Family Size -.0246 (.0019)** -.0232 (.0019)** -.0233 (.0019)**
Number of Children .0180 (.0021)** .0166 (.0021)** .0162 (.0021)**
Foreigner -.0430 (.0032)** -.0400 (.0032)** -.0384 (.0033)**
No English -.0555 (.0046)** -.0543 (.0047)** -.0539 (.0047)**
Disabled -.0153 (.0028)** -.0154 (.0028)** -.0156 (.0028)**
Veteran .0475 (.0022)** .0447 (.0022)** .0415 (.0022)**
Note: Dependent variable is the probability of moving. Reported are probit-estimated marginal probability effects, 
with standard errors in parenthesis. Occupation and industry indicators are included in all specifications but not 
reported. Statistical significance: * = at the 5% level, **= at the 1% level. 
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Table 7: Second Stage Wage Equations Regression Results 
 (1) 
No Housing Costs, No Amenities 
(2) 
Housing Costs, No Amenities 
(3) 
Housing Costs, Amenities 
Movers Non-Movers Movers Non-Movers Movers Non-Movers 
Selection Term -.094 (.015)** .010 (.007) -.072 (.011)** .010 (.007) -.051 (.011)** .009 (.008) 
Age .047 (.005)** .028 (.002)** .047 (.005)** .028 (.002)** .047 (.005)** .027 (.002)** 
Age Squared -.000 (.000)** -.000 (.000)** -.000 (.000)** -.000 (.000)** -.000 (.000)** -.000 (.000)** 
Less High School -.169 (.013)** -.157 (.005)** -.180 (.013)** -.157 (.005)** -.177 (.014)** -.160 (.005)** 
Associate Degree/ Some College .034 (.011)** .047 (.005)** .045 (.011)** .047 (.005)** .052 (.012)** .048 (.006)** 
College Degree .291 (.008)** .256 (.004)** .313 (.008)** .255 (.004)** .334 (.008)** .257 (.004)** 
Post-Graduate Degree .434 (.010)** .417 (.005)** .466 (.009)** .416 (.005)** .488 (.010)** .417 (.006)** 
Black -.186 (.011)** -.189 (.005)** -.200 (.011)** -.189 (.005)** -.207 (.012)** -.191 (.005)** 
Other Race -.152 (.009)** -.170 (.005)** -.151 (.009)** -.170 (.005)** -.159 (.010)** -.177 (.005)** 
Hispanic -.087 (.011)** -.089 (.005)** -.091 (.011)** -.089 (.005)** -.100 (.012)** -.094 (.006)** 
Married .193 (.011)** .200 (.005)** .207 (.011)** .200 (.005)** .220 (.012)** .202 (.006)** 
Never Married .059 (.011)** .094 (.005)** .052 (.011)** .094 (.005)** .047 (.012)** .095 (.006)** 
Family Size -.008 (.007) -.012 (.003)** -.015 (.007)* -.012 (.003)** -.023 (.007)* -.012 (.003)** 
Number of Children .036 (.007)** .033 (.003)** .041 (.007)** .033 (.003)** .048 (.008)** .032 (.003)** 
Foreigner -.117 (.012)** -.162 (.006)** -.118 (.011)** -.163 (.006)** -.123 (.012)** -.164 (.006)** 
No English -.180 (.020)** -.199 (.005)** -.191 (.020)** -.199 (.008)** -.202 (.021)** -.203 (.008)** 
Disabled -.083 (.010)** -.073 (.004)** -.087 (.010)** -.073 (.004)** -.091 (.010)** -.076 (.005)** 
Veteran -.070 (.007)** -.018 (.003)** -.056 (.007)** -.019 (.004)** -.047 (.007)** -.016 (.004)** 
Constant 9.760 (.124)** 9.942 (.060)** 9.621 (.123)** 9.941 (.060)** 9.563 (.132)** 9.854 (.071)** 
Likelihood Ratio Test [p-value] 44.81 [.000] 2.26 [.133] 15.02 [.000] 3.12 [.077] 27.49 [.000] 1.32 [.250] 
Note: Dependent variable is the logarithm of wages. Reported are linear regression estimates, with standard errors in parenthesis. Metropolitan area, occupation, and 
industry fixed effects are included in all specifications. Null hypothesis for Likelihood Ratio Test: no migration selection bias. Statistical significance: * = at the 5% 
level, **= at the 1% level. 
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Table 8: Structural Probit Regression Results, Marginal Probability Effects 
 (1) 
No Housing Costs, 
No Amenities 
(2) 
Housing Costs, 
No Amenities 
(3) 
Housing Costs, 
Amenities 
State of Birth -.1546 (.0018)** -.1567 (.0018)** -.1528 (.0018)** 
Spouse State of Birth -.0906 (.0020)** -.0940 (.0020)** -.0935 (.0018)** 
LogW Difference  .2240 (.0102)** .2045 (.0101)** .2540 (.0111)** 
LogH Difference -- -.0997 (.0028)** -.1276 (.0029)** 
Temperature -- -- -.0007 (.0002)** 
Snowfall -- -- .0003 (.0001)** 
Precipitation Probability  -- -- .0867 (.0136)** 
Probability Air Unhealthy -- -- .2441 (.0456)** 
Crime Rate -- -- .3095 (.1603)** 
Log Population per Square Mile -- -- .0059 (.0010)** 
Pupil/Teacher Ratio -- -- .0008 (.0001)** 
Public Sector -- -- .0005 (.0001)** 
Tax Free State -- -- -.0161 (.0029)** 
Unemployment Rate -- -- .5353 (.0545)** 
Age -.0091 (.0015)** -.0080 (.0015)** -.0093 (.0015)** 
Age Squared .0001 (.0000)** .0000 (.0000)** .0001 (.0000)** 
Less High School -.0320 (.0032)** -.0331 (.0032)** -.0303 (.0033)** 
Associate Degree/Some College .0335 (.0036)** .0332 (.0036)** .0312 (.0037)** 
College Degree .0593 (.0024)** .0629 (.0025)** .0539 (.0026)** 
Post-Graduate Degree .1038 (.0028)** .1050 (.0029)** .0955 (.0030)** 
Black -.0436 (.0029)** -.0423 (.0029)** -.0439 (.0029)** 
Other Race -.0209 (.0028)** -.0118 (.0028)** -.0187 (.0028)** 
Hispanic -.0148 (.0033)** -.0135 (.0033)** -.0246 (.0032)** 
Married .0634 (.0032)** .0585 (.0033)** .0552 (.0034)** 
Never Married -.0147 (.0033)** -.0179 (.0033)** -.0145 (.0033)** 
Family Size -.0246 (.0019)** -.0220 (.0019)** -.0207 (.0019)** 
Number of Children .0166 (.0021)** .0147 (.0021)** .0129(.0022)** 
Foreigner -.0492 (.0031)** -.0446 (.0032)** -.0462 (.0033)** 
No English -.0571 (.0046)** -.0538 (.0047)** -.0529 (.0047)** 
Disabled -.0115 (.0028)** -.0117 (.0029)** -.0101 (.0029)** 
Veteran .0582 (.0023)** .0505 (.0023)** .0487 (.0023)** 
Note: Dependent variable is the probability of moving. Reported are probit-estimated marginal probability effects, 
with standard errors in parenthesis. Occupation and industry indicators are included in all specifications, but are 
not reported. Statistical significance: **= at the 1% level. 
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Table 9: Marginal Probability Effects of Local Ties, Wages, and Housing Costs on Migration 
 (1)
No Housing Costs,
No Amenities
(2)
Housing Costs, 
No Amenities 
(3)
Housing Costs, 
Amenities
State of Birth -15.5 -15.7 -15.4
Spouse State of Birth -9.1 -9.4 -9.3
10% Increase in Local Wages -2.1 -2.0 -2.4
10% Decrease in Local Housing Costs -- -1.3 -1.7
Note: Marginal probability effects (in percentage points) are calculated using the regression results reported in Table 
8. See text for more details. 
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Table 10: Effect of Amenities on Migration Probability, Select Metropolitan Areas 
Mean Migration 
Probability= 22.8% 
Migration 
Probability
Difference 
with Mean Weather Population 
Public 
Finance, 
Economy
Austin, TX 17.8% -5.0 -2.0 -0.8 -2.2
Phoenix, AZ 18.1% -4.7 -3.4 -0.8 -0.6
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX 18.8% -3.9 -1.5 -0.3 -2.2
Houston-Brazoria, TX 20.8% -2.0 -0.5 -0.2 -1.3
San Francisco-Oakland-Vallejo, CA 21.1% -1.7 -1.7 0.5 -0.4
San Diego, CA 21.1% -1.7 -2.5 0.1 0.7
Miami-Hialeah, FL 21.3% -1.5 -1.5 0.2 -0.2
Seattle-Everett, WA 22.0% -0.8 0.9 -0.2 -1.5
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN 22.0% -0.7 2.0 -1.8 -0.9
Atlanta, GA 22.4% -0.4 0.3 -0.1 -0.6
St. Louis, MO-IL 22.4% -0.4 0.1 -0.2 -0.2
Riverside-San Bernardino, CA 23.6% 0.8 -0.2 -0.9 1.9
Boston, MA 23.8% 1.0 1.5 -0.2 -0.4
Philadelphia, PA 23.8% 1.1 0.7 0.1 0.3
Washington, DC 23.9% 1.1 0.2 0.7 0.2
Baltimore, MD 24.0% 1.2 0.6 0.0 0.7
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 24.4% 1.6 -1.2 0.9 1.8
Detroit, MI 24.8% 2.0 1.8 0.5 -0.3
Pittsburgh, PA 24.9% 2.1 2.5 -0.4 0.0
New York-Northeastern NJ 25.0% 2.2 0.9 0.4 1.0
Chicago-Gary-Lake, IL 25.1% 2.3 1.5 0.8 0.0
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 27.4% 4.6 4.4 -0.1 0.3
Note: Marginal probability effects are calculated using the regression results of specification 3, as reported in Table 
8. See text for more details. Austin, TX and Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY are the MSAs with the lowest and highest 
predicted migration probability, respectively. Remaining MSAs are the top 20 MSAs in population size as of 2000. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A: Housing Value Regression Results 
 
Control Variable Coefficient (St. Error) Control Variable Coefficient (St. Error)
Property: <1 acre -.323 (.005)** Heat: Utility Gas .105 (.008)**
1 Bedrooms .085 (.005)** Heat: Tank Gas .043 (.008)**
2 Bedrooms .105 (.006)** Heat: Oil, Other .056 (.007)**
3 Bedrooms .109 (.006)** Heat: Coal/Coke .068 (.007)**
4 Bedrooms .200 (.007)** Heat: Wood -.038 (.031)
5+ Bedrooms .334 (.007)** Heat: Solar Energy .119 (.014)**
No Kitchen -.054 (.009)** Mobile Home/Trailer -.901 (.005)**
Total Rooms -.112 (.003)** Boat, Tent, Van, Other -1.324 (.023)**
Total Rooms Squared .018 (.000)** Attached 1-Family House -.022 (.005)**
Age: 2-5 Years -.063 (.003)** 2 Family Building -.229 (.007)**
Age: 6-10 Years -.149  (.003)** 3-4 Family Building -.231 (.007)**
Age: 11-20 Years -.217 (.003)** 5-9 Family Building -.225 (.007)**
Age: 21-30 Years -.294 (.003)** 10-19 Family Building -.227 (.007)**
Age: 31-40 Years -.300 (.003)** 20-49 Family Building -.251 (.007)**
Age: 41-50 Years -.311 (.003)** 50+ Family Building -.203 (.007)**
Age: 51-60 Years -.332 (.004)** Constant 11.812 (.012)**
Age: 61+ Years -.290 (.003)** MSA Fixed Effects Yes**
Owned with Mortgage .186 (.003)** Observations 759,106
Rent 2.195 (.003)** R-Squared .7775
Note: Dependent variable is the logarithm of housing unit value. Linear regression estimates are reported with 
standard errors in parenthesis. Omitted categories: Property>1 Acre, Studio, With Kitchen, Age: Less 2 Years, 
Owned with no Mortgage Obligation, No Heat, and Detached 1 Family House. Statistical significance: **= at the 
1% level. 
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